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We consider an anisotropic opinion formation process where the set of rules B, that
dictates what is the socially acceptable position, changes following the average voters'
opinion. As in the case of a constant B, conservative (agreement with B) and liberal
(agreement with neighbors) voters' attitudes are still represented by stable ﬁxed
points in the phase space of the system; but with the diﬀerence that the conservative
ﬁxed point is stable for all possible values of the inter-voter interaction. It has been
also observed that when the model is applied to suﬃciently large populations, the
time needed to consolidate a position in agreement with B is ﬁnite. We observed that
there is also a range of values of the interaction where the two stable points coexist,
opening the door for the modeling of bi-stability related phenomena, like stochastic
resonance and hysteresis.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Opinions are highly dynamical mental representations of the individual's beliefs, resulting from inference
processes frequently done with insuﬃcient information. They play a fundamental role in the individual's
reaction to social situations that can trigger collective responses. In this article we analyze a model of
anisotropic opinion formation in a community of interacting agents [1], where the social rule B, which
is the model's source of anisotropy, slowly changes with the average opinion of the population. As it is
presented in [1], we assume that the agents are adaptive in the sense that they learn to produce an opinion
from the available information, and that such learning process is inﬂuenced by B and by neighboring
agents. It has been observed that the dynamics that results from this process (and extended in [2]),
presents two stable points in the phase space of the system, one, dubbed conservative, for low values of
the inter-agent interaction, the other, dubbed liberal, for suﬃciently high values of the interaction. These
two points do not coexist if B is constant. We will demonstrate in the following that if B adapts following
the average opinion of the population, the conservative ﬁxed point becomes stable for all possible values
of the inter-agent interaction.
Following [1] we will represent social issues S ∈ {±1}N by binary strings of length N. These issues are
classiﬁed as socially acceptable (or not) if σB(S) ≡ sgn(B · S) = 1 (−1), where B ∈ RN is the (internal
representation) vector associated to the perceptron B (for a clear deﬁnition of the perceptron network see
[3]), the function sign is deﬁned as sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0, −1 if x < 0, and 0 if x = 0, and the inner product
is the usual one B · S ≡∑Ni=1 BiSi. The agents, also represented by perceptrons, classify the social issues
according to their own internal representations Ja ∈ RN , according to σJa(S) ≡ sgn(Ja · S), where σJa(S)
is the opinion of agent a on issue S. In the current scenario we consider all vectors, i.e. B and all Ja, to be
plastic. Such plasticity is manifested through the way the agents' internal vectors get modiﬁed through
the interaction with the society and their neighbors.
We represent the topology of the society by a directed graph G = {{a}, {ga,b}} where {a} is a set of
vertexes associated with the social agents and {ga,b} is a set of strengths ga,b that represent the inﬂuence
of agent b on agent a. The neighborhood of a is deﬁned as Na = {c ∈ [M ] : ga,c > 0}. The total number
of vertexes (or agents) is M, and the average neighborhood size is deﬁned as:
ν ≡ 1
M
M∑
a=1
|Na|, (1)
where |Na| is the cardinality of the set Na. We will consider graphs with ν ∼ O(1) only. We say a bond
(a, b) is active if ga,b > 0 and passive otherwise.
A. Update Algorithms
Assuming that the population of interacting agents receives information taken from the set S ≡
{(σB,n, σNa,n,Sn), n = 1, . . . , T}, where the issue Sn is presented at time n and then discarded, σB,n =
3sgn(Bn ·S) and σNa,n = {sgn(Jc,n ·Sn) : c ∈ Na} is the set form by the opinions of the agent a's neighbors,
the update equation for the internal representation of a is:
Ja,n+1 = Ja,n + ψa,n
σB,nSn√
N
, (2)
where σBS/
√
N is the (unit length) Hebb vector [4], that indicates the direction of the socially acceptable
position on Sn and ψa,n is the learning amplitude, that regulates how the information is incorporated
in the internal representation of a. The length of the opinion formation process T is considered to be
proportional to the number of issues presented to the agents. Based on social corroboration experiments
[57] and assuming that agent a is connected with the agents in Na, we propose ψa ≡ f |Ja|/
√
N Ψa where
f is a units constant, |Ja|/
√
N =
√∑N
j=1 J
2
a,j/N is a factor that has no impact on the learning eﬃciency
of the algorithm [8] and it has been only considered for technical purposes and:
Ψa ≡ 1−Θ(−σBσa)
∑
c∈Na
ga,c
f
Θ(σaσc), (3)
where Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise is the Heaviside step function. The update algorithm (2) has
been introduced (and discussed) in [1]. Let us deﬁne the unit vectors b ≡ |B|−1B in the direction of the
internal representation of B, ja ≡ |Ja|−1Ja in the direction of the internal representation of agent a and
ja,⊥ = [1− (ja · b)2]−1/2[ja − (ja · b)b] in the direction of the component of Ja perpendicular to B. Given
that an agent's opinion is obtained through information processing using the internal representation vector
Ja, and that any modiﬁcation to the vector B in the direction of B does not produce any change on B's
opinions, we will construct the update algorithm for B by considering the vector:
L ≡ 1
M
M∑
c=1
jc,⊥. (4)
which is the arithmetic average over all the components of the internal representations Jc perpendicular
to B. Observe that B · L = 0 and |L · L| ≤ 1. Then:
Bn+1 = Bn +
λ√
N
fLn, (5)
where λ/
√
N is a suitable scale factor. Observe that if λ ∼ O(1) the updates of B at each time step are
very small, thus λ/
√
N is a measure of the inverse social inertia (if the mass of B is inﬁnite we wouldn't
expect any change at all, thus λ = 0). Observe also that |Bn+1|2 = |Bn|2 +O(f 2N−1), which implies (see
below) that the length of the vector B does not change with the update.
To help describe the state of the system we deﬁne the variables:
φa ≡ σBja · S (6)
β ≡ σBb · S (7)
4and parameters:
Ra ≡ ja · b (8)
Wa,b ≡ ja · jb (9)
Ya,b ≡ ja,⊥ · jb,⊥. (10)
The variables depend explicitly on the information {σB,S} whereas the parameters depend on the internal
representations {{Ja},B} only. The variable β ≥ 0 and the smaller the β(S) the higher the likelihood of
S to be a socially neutral issue. (An issue S0 is dubbed socially neutral if there is no socially accepted
position about it, i.e. B ·S0 = 0.) The variable φa(S) indicates how much the vector Ja has to be modiﬁed
to agree with B. If φa  0 the modiﬁcation needed is negligible, if φa ' 0 the modiﬁcation needed is
moderated and if φa  0 the modiﬁcation needed is substantial. The parameter Ra represents the level
of agreement of agent a with the society B, Wa,b represents the level of agreement between agents a and b
and the parameter Ya,b represents the level of agreement between agents a and b on socially neutral issues.
Given thatWa,b = RaRb+Ya,b
√
(1−R2a)(1−R2b) we only need to know {Ra} and {Ya,b} to know the state
of the society.
B. Update Equations
Given a graph G = {{a}, {ga,b}} with vertexes {a} and bonds {ga,b}, the state of the society can be
described by the sets of parameters {Ra}, deﬁned on the vertexes and {Ya,b}, deﬁned on the bonds of
G. The data accessible to the agent a is (σB, φa, φNa ,S) where φNa ≡ {φc|c ∈ Na}. The length of such a
training set is T = αmaxN , which implies that αmax = T/N. For a given number 1 ≤ n < N of examples
presented to the perceptrons there is an 0 < α < αmax such that n = α(n)N . Observe that, given that
the minimum increment in the number of examples presented is 1, ∆α(n) ≡ α(n + 1)− α(n) = 1/N . By
deﬁning ∆t ≡ f∆α = f/N and by using the update rules (2) and (5), we have that the equation for the
evolution of the parameters Ra and Ya,b are:
∆Ra
∆t
= Ψa (β −Raφa) + λ
√
1−R2aY a +O(∆t) (11)
∆Ya,b
∆t
=
Ψa√
1−R2a
[
φb −Rbβ√
1−R2b
− Ya,bφa −Raβ√
1−R2a
]
− λRa√
1−R2a
(
Y b − Ya,bY a
)
+
+ITb,a +O(∆t) (12)
where Y a ≡ M−1
∑
c Ya,c and ITb,a represents a set of terms, identical to the previous ones in (12) with
the indexes a and b interchanged.
C. Large System Size Limit: Diﬀerential Equations
For suﬃciently large N and suﬃciently small f , the divided diﬀerence equation (11) and (12) can be
transformed into diﬀerential equations. It also occurs that the components of a social issue S are i.i.d
5variables with P(S) = ∏Nj=1[12δSj ,1 + 12δSj ,−1] where δS,X = 1 if S = X and 0 otherwise is the Kronecker
delta. This stochastic character is inherited by the variables β and {φa}, whose joint probability, in the
large N limit can be estimated. In particular, for a society with only two voters we have that the joint
probability is given by:
P (β, φa, φb) = N
(
β
∣∣Σa,bΛ(φa, φb),Σ2a,b )N (φb ∣∣Wa,bφa, 1−W 2a,b )N (φa) (13)
where N (x|µ, σ2) ≡ exp (−(x− µ)2/2σ2) /√2piσ2 is a Gaussian distribution on x, centered at µ and with
variance σ2, N (x) = N (x|0, 1) and
Σ2a,b ≡
(1−R2a)(1−R2b)(1− Y 2a,b)
1−W 2a,b
(14)
Λ(φa, φb) ≡ (Ra −Wa,bφb)φa + (Rb −Wa,bRa)φb√
(1−R2a)(1−R2b)(1− Y 2a,b)(1−W 2a,b)
. (15)
The full derivation of these expressions is presented in the appendix of [1]. For larger communities the
joint probability is much harder to obtain, but it can be estimated by considering an independent bond
approximation (also presented in [1]). Finally we have to consider the distribution of the parameters
{Ra} and {Ya,b}. Following [9], these parameters can be prove to be self-averaging in the large N limit, i.e.
limN→∞ 〈Ra〉 = Ra and limN→∞ 〈Ya,b〉 = Ya,b, where 〈x〉 =
´
dxP(x)x. This is a consequence from the fact
that for most cases the distribution of the parameters, inferred from the distribution of the issues S, is such
that the variances σ2R ≡
〈
(Ra − 〈Ra〉)2
〉
and σ2Y ≡
〈
(Ya,b − 〈Ya,b〉)2
〉
satisfy limN→∞ σ2R = limN→∞ σ
2
Y = 0.
1. Dimer
In the large N limit and for a population of only two voters we obtain the following equations:
R˙a =
2− ηa,b
2
(1−R2a) +
ηa,b
2
[
(1−R2a)
arccos(Ya,b)
pi
+ ρa,b (Rb −Wa,bRa)
]
+ λ
√
1−R2a
1 + Ya,b
2
(16)
R˙b =
2− ηb,a
2
(1−R2b) +
ηb,a
2
[
(1−R2b)
arccos(Ya,b)
pi
+ ρb,a (Ra −Wa,bRb)
]
+ λ
√
1−R2b
1 + Ya,b
2
(17)
Y˙a,b =
1− Y 2a,b
2
[
2
√
1−R2bηa,bρa,b − λRa√
1−R2a
+ ITb,a
]
. (18)
where ηc,d ≡ limf→0 f−1gc,d and
ρa,b ≡ 1
2
− 1
pi
arctan
 Ra −Wa,bRb√
(1−R2a)(1−R2b)(1− Y 2a,b)
 . (19)
Supposing without loss of generality that ηa,b < ηb,a, we found that there are only two stable points in
the phase space of the system deﬁned over the domain S ≡ {(Ra, Rb, Ya,b) : Ra, Rb, Ya,b ∈ [−1, 1]}, namely
6C? = (1, 1,−1), the conservative point, and L? = (−Rr,−Rv, 1), the liberal point, where:
Rr ≡
√
1−
(
2λ
ηa,b − 2
)2
(20)
Rv ≡ A
√
A2 + C2 − 4λ2 − 2λC
A2 + C2
(21)
and:
A ≡ ηb,a(1 +Rr)− 2 (22)
C ≡ 2ηb,aλ
ηa,b − 2 . (23)
For values of ηa,b ∈ [0, 2(λ+ 1)] and ηb,a > ηa,b we have that C? is the only stable point and for 2(1 + λ) <
ηa,b < ηb,a both C
? and L? are stable. To demonstrate this statement we ﬁrst observe that for |Ya,b| ' 1
we can approximate:
ρa,b ' Θ
(
Ya,bRb
√
1−R2a −Ra
√
1−R2b
)
(24)
ρb,a ' Θ
(
Ya,bRa
√
1−R2b −Rb
√
1−R2a
)
. (25)
Close to the conservative point we can write Ra = cosα, Rb = cos β, and Ya,b = cos(pi − y) for suﬃciently
small α, β, y > 0. (Given that C? is a point in the border of the domain S, α, β, y > 0.) In such a case
Ya,bRa
√
1−R2b − Rb
√
1−R2a ' Ya,bRb
√
1−R2a − Ra
√
1−R2b ' −α − β and ρa,b ' ρb,a ' 0. Therefore
the system formed by the equations (16), (17) and (18) can be expressed as:
α˙ ' −α (26)
β˙ ' −β (27)
y˙ ' −λ
(
1
α
+
1
β
)
y2
2
. (28)
Thus α, β and y decay exponentially.
If 2(1 + λ) < ηa,b < ηb,a the previous stability analysis is also valid and C
? is still a stable point of
the system. For values of Ra and Rb suﬃciently close to −Rr and −Rv we can propose Ya,b = cos y,
Ra = cos(pi − θr + α) and Rb = cos(pi − θv + β), where θr = arccos(Rr), θv = arccos(Rv), and with α, β, y
suﬃciently small. Observe that ηa,b < ηb,a then Ra > Rb, Rv > Rr and θr > θv (see Appendix A). Then,
Ya,bRa
√
1−R2b−Rb
√
1−R2a ' −Rv
√
1−R2r+Rr
√
1−R2v = sin(θv−θr) and ρa,b ' 0. Similarly ρb,a ' 1,
thus:
α˙ ' −ηa,b − 2
2
Rrα (29)
β˙ ' ηb,a
2
cos(θr − θv)α−
[
ηb,a − 2
2
Rv +
ηb,a
2
cos(θr − θv)
]
β (30)
y˙ ' −
[
2
√
1−R2r
1−R2v
ηb,a + λ
(
Rv√
1−R2v
+
Rr√
1−R2r
)]
y2
2
. (31)
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Figure 1. R˙ as a function of R when (a) 2λ > η − 2 and (b) 2λ < η − 2. In the ﬁrst case there is only on stable
ﬁxed point (R = 1) in the second there are two co-existing stable ﬁxed points R = −Rr (equation (20)) and R = 1.
The coeﬃcient at the right hand side (RHS) of (29) is positive if ηa,b > 2. Rris well deﬁned if ηa,b > 2(1+λ)
thus α→ 0 exponentially. The factor in the second term at the RHS of (30) is positive, then β also decays
exponentially. Finally the RHS of (31) is negative thus Ya,b → 1 from bellow.
These results can be condensed into an eﬀective model deﬁned by the following equations:
R˙a = 1−R2a +
1 + Y effa,b
2
[
−ηa,b
2
(1−R2a) +
(ηa,b
2
Θ(Rb −Ra) sin(θa − θb) + λ
)√
1−R2a
]
(32)
R˙b = 1−R2b +
1 + Y effa,b
2
[
−ηb,a
2
(1−R2b) +
(ηb,a
2
Θ(Ra −Rb) sin(θb − θa) + λ
)√
1−R2b
]
, (33)
where Y effa,b is completely determined by the values of the social strengths and the initial conditions. Let us
deﬁne ηmin ≡ {ηa,b, ηb,a} and Rmin = Ra if ηmin = ηa,b and Rb otherwise. Then Y effa,b = 1 if ηmin > 2(1 + λ)
and Rmin(0) < Rr. Observe that the presence of this eﬀective bond Y
eff
a,b is a direct consequence of B
adapting to the average position of the dimer. The stability of this eﬀective system is illustrated in ﬁgure
1. If ηmin < 2(1 + λ) then there is only one stable point (ﬁgure 1 (a)), whereas if ηmin > 2(1 + λ) there are
two stable points (ﬁgure 1 (b)).
Following the deﬁnitions introduced in [1], we will dub an agent a consensual if it is within the basin of
attraction of C? and polarizing if it is not. In term of the social strengths, an agent has an attitude that
is conservative if ηa,b < 2(1 + λ), and liberal otherwise.
8D. Beyond the dimer
Following [1] we obtain for the vertexes and bond variables of a given graph the following set of equations:
R˙a =
(
1−
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
)
(1−R2a) +
+
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
[
(1−R2a)
ϕa,c
pi
+ ρa,c (Rc −Wa,cRa)
]
+ λ
√
1−R2aY a (34)
Y˙a,b = (1− Y 2a,b)
√
1−R2b
1−R2a
ηa,bρa,b − λRa√
1−R2a
(
Y b − Ya,bY a
)
+ ITb,a. (35)
With the insight gained from the dimer case we assume that there exists at least two ﬁxed points, one
conservative, present for all values of the social strengths if λ > 0 and characterized by a positive value of
the magnetization:
µ ≡ lim
t→∞
1
M
∑
a
Ra(t) (36)
and one liberal, present for suﬃciently large values of the social strengths and characterized by a negative
value of the magnetization.
If we impose the homogeneity condition:
Y a = Y b = Y ≡ 1
M2
∑
a,b
Ya,b (37)
which we expect to be valid for suﬃciently large societies (i.e. 1  M) with low connectivity (i.e. if the
size of a typical neighborhood is a quantity of order 1) and considering that most of the terms in (37)
come from passive bonds (ηa,b = ηb,a = 0) :
Y =
1
M
∑
a
{
1
M
∑
b∈Na
Ya,b +
1
M
∑
b/∈Na
Ya,b
}
=
1
M2
∑
a
∑
b/∈Na
Ya,b +O(M
−1),
we conclude that:
Y˙ = −2λK Y (1− Y ) +O(M−1), (38)
where:
K ≡ 1
M
∑
a
Ra√
1−R2a
. (39)
Observe that there are two possible stable values for Y , satisfying Y
?
= Θ(−K). We expect K > 0 (< 0) if
there is a suﬃcient number of consensual (polarizing) agents with Ra → 1(−1). This estimate implies that
if K > 0, we are in a conservative phase where the average position within a neighborhood of voters diﬀer
to the average position of a diﬀerent neighborhood on neutral social issues. Collectively, this adds up to a
Y = 0. If K < 0 we are in a liberal phase where diﬀerent neighborhoods agree on socially neutral issues,
9producing an eﬀective Y = 1. In these circumstances the equation (35) for active bonds is transformed
into:
Y˙a,b '
[√
1−R2b
1−R2a
ηa,bρa,b(1 + Ya,b)− λ Ra√
1−R2a
Θ(−K) + ITb,a
]
(1− Ya,b). (40)
It is straight forward to conclude that if K > 0 or if K  0 (where most of the agents are polarizing,
i.e. Rc < 0) Ya,b → 1. Equations (40) and the correspondent (34) become very diﬃcult to analyze for
intermediate values of K ∈ (−Kmin, 0), which occur for values of the social strengths such that νη '
2(1 + λ), where ν is the average neighborhood size (1) and η =
∑
ηa,b>0
ηa,b/
∑
ηa,b>0
1 is the average social
strength considering only active bonds. Preliminary numerical experiments suggest that for these values
of η the ﬁnal states of the system are extremely sensitive to the initial conditions. Such an analysis will
be left for a future work.
By using that for the set of values of the social strengths for which the system is tractable the values of
Ya,b correspondent to active bonds converge to one, we propose the following equation for the set {Ra} :
R˙a =
(
1−
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
)
(1−R2a) +
[∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
Θ(Rc −Ra) sin(θa − θc) + λ
]√
1−R2a. (41)
Let us deﬁne the eﬀective social strength on a by its neighbors by the expression:
Ha ≡
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c. (42)
Let us assume that if Ha < Hb and after a suﬃciently long time 0 t0 Ra ≥ Rb. With this assumption in
mind and without lose of generality, let us rearrange the labels in such a way that H1 < H2 < · · · < HM .
Then we have that for a time t > t0 there are a number of agents with equations of the form:
R˙n =
(
1− Hn
2
)
(1−R2n) + λ
√
1−R2n (43)
where all agents (n), whose equations of motion do not depend on the variables associated to other agents,
are characterized by having constants Hn < Hni where ni ∈ Nn, so n has a more conservative attitude than
its neighbors. We will call such agents the nucleating centers. The dynamic behavior of the nucleating
centers depends on the value of the constant Hn and (if Hn > 2(1 +λ)) of the value of Rn at time t0 where
the order Rn > Rn1 for all n1 ∈ Nn is established. To support this claim, let us integrate (43):
t− t0 = −2
ˆ θ
θ0
dx
2λ+ (2−Hn) sinx. (44)
If H < 2(1 + λ) there is only one ﬁxed point, R? = 1, reached from any initial condition θ0 ∈ (0, pi). There
are three possible situations in this phase:
t−t0 =

4√
(2−Hn)2−4λ2
[
arctanh
(√
(2−Hn)2−4λ2
2−Hn
)
− arctanh
( √
(2−Hn)2−4λ2
2λ tan(θ0/2)+2−Hn
)]
Hn < 2(1− λ)
2
λ
tan(θ0/2)
tan(θ0/2)+1
Hn = 2(1− λ)
4√
4λ2−(2−Hn)2
[
arctan
(
2λ tan(θ0/2)+2−Hn√
4λ2−(2−Hn)2
)
− arctan
(
2−Hn√
4λ2−(2−Hn)2
)]
2(1− λ) < Hn < 2(1 + λ)
(45)
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but in all cases t−t0 <∞. At the critical point we have that Hn = 2(1+λ), in which case we have that the
stable points are R?n = cos(θ
?) with θ? = 0, pi and basins of attraction (0, pi/2) and (pi/2, pi) respectively:
t− t0 =

2
λ
tan(θ0/2)
tan(θ0/2)+1
θ0 ∈
(
0, pi
2
)
limθ→0 1θ θ0 ∈
(
pi
2
, pi
)
.
(46)
Finally, for Hn > 2(1 + λ) we have that the two stable points are R
?
n = cos(θ
?) with θ? = 0, pi− θr , where
θr ≡ arccos
√1− ( 2λ
Hn − 2
)2 , (47)
and basins of attraction (0, θr) and (θr, pi) respectively:
t− t0 =

4√
(Hn−2)2−4λ2
[
arctanh
( √
(Hn−2)2−4λ2
Hn−2−2λ tan(θ0/2)
)
− arctanh
(√
(Hn−2)2−4λ2
Hn−2
)]
θ0 ∈ (0, θr)
limθ→0 ln
(
1
θ
)
θ0 ∈ (θr, pi).
(48)
Those, we observe that for all initial conditions belonging to the basin of attraction of the conservative
point R?n = 1 the duration of the opinion formation process is ﬁnite. The time the process lasts to reach
the liberal position R?n = cos(pi − θr) when Hn > 2(1 + λ) and θ0 ∈ (θr, pi) is inﬁnite.
Suppose agent (o) is a nucleating center, suppose also that the initial the condition Ro(t0) ∈ (cos θr, 1)
(conservative basin of attraction) and the current time t is suﬃciently larger than t0 to ensure convergence
to R?o = 1. The element of o1 ∈ No with the lowest eﬀective social strength Ho1 , is ruled by the equation
R˙o1 =
(
1− Ho1 − ηo1,o
2
)
(1−R2o1) + λ
√
1−R2o1 (49)
which is identical to (43) and can be analyzed in the same way. Also observe that the presence of a
consensual agent increases the chances of producing new nucleating centers due to the reduction of the
eﬀective social strength of its neighbors, as it is observed in the ﬁrst term of the RHS of (49). This
nucleating eﬀect has been observed previously, close to the critical value of the social strength, i.e. H ∼
2(1 + λ). If the eﬀective strengths HoL of agents located at a distance L of the nucleating center are
suﬃciently large, it may occur that R?oL < 0, and a border of polarizing agents emerge around a cluster of
consensual agents. Such clusters have been observed emerging in the numerical experiments presented in
[1]. In the following section we will explore the distribution of cluster sizes as a function of the strengths
{ηa,b} in the square lattice.
II. ESTIMATED OBSERVABLES AND EXPERIMENTS IN THE SQUARE LATTICE
We consider the case of the agents sitting in the vertexes of a square lattice and where the ηa,c are
drawn from a Gaussian distribution centered at η and with variance ∆2. η, the average social strength,
represents the average inﬂuence neighbors have on each other and, in an indirect form, it also represents a
level of discontent with B. The parameter ∆ controls the level of variation, or disorder, in the set of social
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strengths. In the following we present a theoretical analysis based on the distribution of social strengths,
disregarding the initial conditions of the variables {Ra(0)}.
On a square lattice each agent is linked to precisely four neighbors. The expression:
P0 :=
ˆ 2(1+λ)
−∞
dx√
2pi(2∆)2
exp
{
−1
2
(
x− 4η
2∆
)2}
= H
(
4η − 2(1 + λ)
2∆
)
, (50)
where H(x) ≡ ´∞
x
dyN (y) is the Gardner error function, represents the probability that a vertex o has a
conservative attitude 2(1+λ) >
∑
c∈No ηo,c, in which case, for times not smaller than a suﬃciently large t0,
Ro > Rb for all b ∈ No. At a link away from o there are the neighbors No = {o1, o2, o3, o4}. The probability
that these sites have a conservative attitude is, in similar manner and given that the center o is consensual,
P1,0 := H
(
3η − 2(1 + λ)√
3∆
)
. (51)
The vertexes of the square that complete the ﬁrst layer around o have only two neighbors each that may
not be consensual, thus
P1,1 := H
(
2η − 2(1 + λ)√
2∆
)
, (52)
thus the probability of having a consensual cluster with only one layer of agents around the nucleating
center is
P1 = P0P41,0P41,1. (53)
By repeating this process L times, the probability of having a consensual cluster with L layers is
PL(η,∆) = P0(η,∆)[P1,0(η,∆)]4L[P1,1(η,∆)]4L
2
. (54)
In order to measure the distribution of clusters in a square lattice of side
√
M, we propose the following
quantities:
〈L〉 ≡
∑√M
j=1 jPj(η,∆)∑√M
j=1 Pj(η,∆)
(55)
σL ≡
√
〈L2〉 − 〈L〉2 (56)
〈L〉 is the estimated size of the cluster for the given values of the social strength and the disorder parameter,
and σL its standard deviation.
Consider now the following observables:
µ(η,∆) ≡ 1
M
∑
a
Ra(tmax), (57)
the magnetization, which measures the average social agreement with B, and the correlations deﬁned as:
C`(η,∆) =
1
M
1
8`
∑
a
∑
b∈Na(`)
Ra(tmax)Rb(tmax)− µ2(η,∆), (58)
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where Na(`) is the set of agents located in the `-th shell of agent a. The behavior of the correlation can
be modeled by the expression:
C`(η,∆) = C0(η,∆) exp
(
− `
ξ(η,∆)
)
, (59)
where ξ(η,∆) is the correlation length and C0(η,∆) is the susceptibility.
To better understand the behavior of a system described by the equation (41) we perform a number of
numerical experiments on a square grid, where we placed the member of a society of size M = 104, with
periodic boundary conditions. The agents are connected to their ﬁrst neighbors only with social strengths
{ηab} extracted from a Gaussian distribution with η mean and variance ∆2. Observe that, although the
{ηa,b} so produced are allowed to have negative values, the values of η and ∆ used are such that the chances
of a negative social strength occurring are negligible. The social update constant was kept constant at
λ = 0.1. The evolution of the agents' agreement with B is obtained from the system (41), which was
numerically integrated using a second order Runge-Kutta method, for a maximum time tmax = 100 time
units, with initial conditions uniformly distributed in [−1, 1], and for a variety of values for the parameters
η and ∆. For each ∆ = 0.001, 0.01 in increments of 0.001 and from 0.01 to 0.09 in increments of 0.01 we
found the value of η?(∆) that satisﬁes the equation µ(η?,∆) = 0. For those values (η?(∆),∆) we computed
〈L〉 (55) and σL (56), and estimated ξ(η?(∆),∆) averaged over 10 independent runs of the Runge-Kutta
integration process. The results of these experiences are presented in ﬁgure 2.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a model of opinion formation in societies of adaptive agents where there is a set of rules
B that determined what is socially acceptable. In the present work we allow B to adjust according to the
average position of the population with a constant of proportionality λ. By the application of statistical
mechanics techniques we constructed a description of the system's behavior based on a set of diﬀerential
equations ruling the evolution of the parameters {Ra}, that represent the agreement of the agents {a}
with B, and {Yab} that represent the agreement between two connected agents a and b on neutral issues
(i.e. issues for which B has no opinion). For the case of a society with only two individuals, the system
can be described by the equations (16), (17) and (18). For this system there are only two stable ﬁxed
points, dubbed the conservative point C? with co-ordinates R?a = R
?
b = −Y ?a,b = 1, and the liberal point
L? with co-ordinates R?max = −Rr, R?min = −Rv and Y ?a,b = 1, where Rmin(max) ≡ min(max){Ra, Rb}, and
Rr and Rv are given by (20) and (21) respectively. We observe that in the case of λ > 0 and opposite to
the case reported in [1] where λ = 0, consensual agents converge to the position of B, represented by C?,
with opposite positions on neutral issues. This eﬀect is due to the action of B to adapt to the average
position of a and b. The vector obtained by averaging the internal representations of a and b is a coplanar
vector bisecting the angle subtended between Ja and Jb. If the internal representation of B is modiﬁed,
it eventually position itself in between Ja and Jb and, given that the plane perpendicular to the internal
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Figure 2. Expected number of layers in the typical cluster 〈L〉±σL (full line) within one standard deviation (light
shadow), and correlation lengths ξ (full circles, averaged over 10 independent numerical integrations of (41)) as
functions of the disorder ∆, for values of the social strength η?(∆), λ = 0.1, for a society of M = 10000 agents
arranged on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. In the insets we have snapshots of the system at,
from left to right, ∆ = 0.001, 0.005, 0.06, and 0.09 respectively. The pixel at position (i, j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 100 in the
insets represents the value of Ri,j with values between -1 and 1 according to the provided scale.
representation B has also changed, Ja,⊥ and Jb,⊥ become collinear and opposite. Thus, the eﬀective action
of B adapting to the average position of the voters favors a consensus constructed over the polarization of
the agents' positions on the plane of neutral issues. Only when the social strengths are suﬃciently high,
both agents become polarized with respect to B and with equal positions on socially neutral issues. In
this case the adaptation of B is only suﬃcient to reduce the ﬁnal position of a and b to −Rr > −Rv > −1
(remember that in the case λ = 0 Ra = Rb = −1).
For a larger population M > 2, the equations obtained by averaging the divided diﬀerence equations
(11) and (12) using the probability distribution from the independent bond approximation are equations
(34) and (35). We observed that, in the homogeneous approximation (37), the average Y is constructed
mostly with terms that correspond to passive bonds. Such a quantity is ruled by a diﬀerential equation
with two ﬁxed points Y
?
= 0, 1. The ﬁxed point Y
?
= 0 appears for suﬃciently low values of the social
strengths. In this phase is also observed that the connected bond parameters converge to Y ?a,b = 1. Thus,
in this conservative phase, the eﬀect of the adaptation of B to the average position of the population
produces an overall disagreement on socially neutral issues between neighborhoods that are mutually
disconnected, producing Y = 0. For large enough values of the social strengths we observe an overall
agreement amongst the agents that adds up to Y = 1. The model as it stands from (34) and (35) becomes
diﬃcult to analyze for intermediate values of the social strengths νη ∼ 2(1 + λ). This problem arises from
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the construction of the joint probability P(β, {φa,}), which is an approximation based on independent
bonds. In this approximation the eﬀect of neighbors is overestimated, producing diﬀerential equations
with no stable steady points close to the boundary between the liberal and conservative phases. To
overcome this problem we considered the eﬀective model presented in equation (41), where the values of
the {Ya,b} for active bonds is set to 1. Such an equation is not obtained by averaging (11) with a suitable
joint probability, but by generalizing the eﬀective system of equations for the dimer ((32) and (33)).
The eﬀective model presented in equation (41) also admits one stable point (conservative) for suﬃciently
low values of the social strengths and two stable points (one conservative and one liberal) for suﬃciently
large values of the social strengths. The main characteristic of this model probably is that the length of
the learning process (i.e. the time required to reach a ﬁx point in the phase space) is ﬁnite if the initial
conditions are in the conservative basin of attraction (equations (45 to 48)).
By considering the social strengths to be drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean η and variance
∆2 for a population of interactive agents placed on a square lattice, we estimated the expected size of
the conservative clusters 〈L〉 and its standard deviation σL, equations (55) and (56), to be formed around
nucleating centers, as deﬁned by (43). We contrasted this quantity with the correlation length (59) obtained
from numerical integrations of (41), at the point of transition between the conservative (low average social
strength) and liberal (high average social strength) phases, deﬁned by µ(η,∆) = 0. The results, presented
in ﬁgure 2, show that these quantities are strongly correlated.
The most relevant eﬀect observed, the emergence of conservative clusters when the average importance
to the peers' opinions is increased, has a clear interpretation in the context of opinion formation. Let
us assume we live in a society where the status quo B is well established. Suppose there is evidence
in support of an action against the established order, and in consequence a policy is made to challenge
B. Such evidence may produce a change in attitude in the social members, trying to corroborate their
opinions by contrasting them with their peers (increase in η). Such corroboration is not sought when there
is general conformity with B. Members of the society that remain in agreement with B have the eﬀect
of leaders [10] and conservative clusters emerge and remain, even if η is increased by the emergence of
more evidence in favor of the challenging policy. It has been observed that the eﬀect of a positive λ for
large enough values of the social strengths is the stabilization of the conservative ﬁxed point R = 1. The
analysis of a bi-stable system under periodic perturbations [11] has been left for a following article.
Appendix A: Demonstration of the order associated to the social strengths
Observe that our analysis is based on the supposition that if ηa,b < ηb,a then, at the stable point and in
a neighborhood of it we have that Rb < Ra. Observe that by the deﬁnitions of A and C (equations (22)
and (23) respectively) we have that:
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ηb,a > ηa,b > 2(1 + λ)
ηb,aRr + ηb,a − 2 > ηb,aRr + ηa,b − 2 > 0(
2λ
ηa,b − 2
)2
(ηb,aRr + ηb,a − 2)2 >
(
2λ
ηa,b − 2
)2
(ηb,aRr + ηa,b − 2)2(
2λ
ηa,b − 2
)2
A2 > (CRr + 2λ)
2
(
1−R2r
)
A2 > C2R2r + 4λCRr + 4λ
2
(A2 + C2)A2 > (A2 + C2)
(
(A2 + C2)R2r + 4λCRr + 4λ
2
)
(A2 + C2 − 4λ2)A2 > (A2 + C2)2R2r + 4(A2 + C2)λCRr + 4λ2C2
(A2 + C2 − 4λ2)A2 > [(A2 + C2)Rr + 2λC]2√
A2(A2 + C2 − 4λ2) > (A2 + C2)Rr + 2λC
lim
t→∞
Ra(t) = −Rr > 2λC −
√
A2(A2 + C2 − 4λ2)
A2 + C2
= −Rv = lim
t→∞
Rb(t) 2.
Thus, for a suﬃciently large t, we have that Ra(t) > Rb(t) due to the continuity of these functions.
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